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Judge Pauley’s Opinion in Clapper: Reset Button for Bulk Collection Debate?
By Peter Margulies  Saturday, December 28, 2013, 8:00 AM
Friday’s ruling by S.D.N.Y. judge William H. Pauley in Clapper is a welcome corrective to the anti-metadata clamor triggered by Judge Leon’s
Klayman opinion and the President’s Review Group Report.  While no district court opinion represents the last word, the opinion by Judge Pauley
de¾ates the overblown arguments made by metadata critics on the program’s ef½cacy, the quality of judicial and congressional oversight, and the
continued vitality of the Supreme Court’s precedent in Smith v. Maryland.  Because Judge Pauley’s opinion is balanced, it also provides some
support for reform of the Section 215 process to ensure more public input.  The care and balance evident in Judge Pauley’s opinion make it a useful
template for further deliberation.
On the question of ef½cacy, Judge Pauley is emphatic that the metadata program helps the government connect the dots.  The opinion cites 9/11
hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar, who made calls from San Diego to an Al Qaeda safe house in Yemen.  Had the metadata program been in place before
September 11, Judge Pauley notes, the government would have had a better chance of detecting the 9/11 conspiracy.  Judge Pauley ½nds that the
ability to query metadata with identi½ers based on “reasonable and articulable suspicion” of links to terrorism allows the government to ½nd
“connections between known and unknown international terrorist operatives.”  He cites the arrest of aspiring New York subway bomber Najibullah
Zazi and the investigation of Mumbai bombing conspirator David Headley.
Sometimes, as Ryan Goodman suggests in a useful post over at Just Security, the NSA’s connect-the-dots capability permits ruling out foreign
connections to plots such as the Boston Marathon bombing.  This capability, while it may not be as snazzy to metadata critics as snif½ng out a
pending plot, can inform law enforcement allocation of resources in the frenzied hours after an attack.  If the quick elimination of speculation about
a foreign link in the Boston Marathon bombing helped focus resources on the Tsarnaev brothers’ role, that bene½t supplies at least a partial
justi½cation for the metadata program.  Moreover, Judge Pauley’s careful analysis of the ef½cacy issue contrasts with the truncated approach in the
President’s Review Group report, which devoted less than one page of a 300-page study to this crucial question (see my post here).
Judge Pauley’s nuanced discussion of ef½cacy also demonstrates how the metadata program meets Section 215’s relevance standard.  As Judge
Pauley indicates, Congress clearly understood the threat posed by Al Qaeda’s ability to develop lethal plots in a “decentralized” fashion. 
Neutralizing Al Qaeda’s asymmetric advantage, Judge Pauley ½nds, requires that the government have the ability to connect “fragmented and
¾eeting communications.”  Without the “counter-punch” supplied by metadata collection, the government risks ceding the long-term initiative to
Al Qaeda and associated forces.  Allowing the concept of relevance to evolve with the shifting terrorist threat was an eminently sensible strategy for
Congress in 2006, when it added the relevance standard.  As Judge Pauley points out, any doubt about Congress’s calculus is extinguished by
Congress’s reauthorization of Section 215 in 2010 and 2011, when members of Congress had the twin bene½ts of, (1) access to documents that
described the metadata program, and, (2) the public criticism of the metadata program by senators Wyden and Udall, who warned (in Wyden’s
words) of the “discrepancy between what most Americans believe is legal and what the government is actually doing under the Patriot Act.”
Judge Pauley asserts that these two sources would place any legislator not in a coma on notice that the NSA and the FISC had broadly interpreted
the statutory relevance standard.  Indeed, Judge Pauley describes as “curious” Wisconsin representative James Sensenbrenner’s claim that he had no
inkling of the metadata program before the Snowden disclosures.  Judge Pauley bases his skepticism on Sensenbrenner’s receipt, as a Judiciary
Committee member, of summaries of FISC decisions, the decisions themselves, and access to government brie½ngs and white papers.  Congress
could not have ensured knowledge of the metadata program by the American public, Pauley explains, without disclosing the program’s operation to
our adversaries.  Congress reasonably concluded, Pauley intimates, that this disclosure posed an unacceptable risk to national security.
Pauley’s discussion of Congress’s role dovetails with his discussion of robust oversight by the FISC.  Pauley cites the “iterative process” (quoting
ODNI Counsel Bob Litt) that the FISC engages in with the government, often requiring changes in initial requests.  This iterative process does not
resemble the “rubber stamp” label that metadata program critics have tried to paste on the FISC’s efforts.  In addition, Pauley’s own pedigree as a
Clinton appointee (as well as Judge Leon’s nomination by George W. Bush) subtly counters the glib claims of NSA critics, embraced by the
Presidential Review Group, that the selection of FISC judges requires reform.  For federal judges like Pauley and Leon and the subset of judges
serving on the FISC, the identity of the appointing authority is not destiny.  The vigilance of FISC judges like Reggie Walton and John Bates
demonstrates that the appointment of FISC judges by the Chief Justice promotes sound judicial oversight.  In contrast, the Presidential Review
Group’s recommendation that Associate Justices of the Supreme Court designate members of the FISC would prove cumbersome in implementation
and detract from the functioning of both the FISC and the Supreme Court.
On the Fourth Amendment, Judge Pauley’s opinion also counsels a salutary caution on the premature burial of Smith v. Maryland and the third-party
doctrine.  Judge Leon dismissed the third-party doctrine as obsolete in Klayman.  However, Judge Pauley’s opinion reminds us that reports of the
doctrine’s demise are greatly exaggerated.  As Orin Kerr observes in a paper cited by Judge Pauley, the third-party doctrine is based on consent – a
caller who avails herself of a carrier’s services has implicitly consented to reasonable government access to call record (but not content)
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information.  The third-party doctrine, Kerr points out, is defensive in nature: it deprives “savvy wrongdoers” (including terrorists) of the ability to
use third-party services such as telecom carriers as safe harbors in the planning and execution of crimes.  A different result would disturb the Fourth
Amendment’s careful balance between liberty and security.  The Supreme Court’s 2012 requirement in Jones of a warrant for planting a GPS device
does not discredit the third-party doctrine, Judge Pauley asserts.  Jones, according to Judge Pauley, merely requires a heightened standard for the
physical, more comprehensive intrusion connoted by the surveillance in that case, which has none of the elements of consent that drive the third-
party doctrine.
While Judge Pauley’s opinion redresses the balance in the metadata debate, it is not a recipe for complacency.  Judge Pauley acknowledges that the
FISC’s current ex parte procedures, while useful for preserving secrecy, are not “ideal” for deciding questions about statutory authority.  Accordingly,
Judge Pauley ventures, debate should progress on institutional means for giving the public “a voice” in the FISC’s deliberations.  Senator Feinstein’s
reform bill, approved by the Senate Intelligence Committee, proposes changes along these lines; more far-reaching reforms are also worthy of
discussion.  Judge Pauley’s judicious opinion can help anchor that discussion in a more re¾ective assessment of the metadata program’s role.
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